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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAVON BELNAP DUNCAN, Ad-
ministratrix of the Estate of Marion 
W. Duncan, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
~VESTERN REFRIGERATION CO., 
&a UTAH ICE & STORAGE 
COMPANY, and NORTON F. 
HECKER, and HARTFORD AC-
CIDENT & INDEMNITY COM-
PANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9173 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
THE FACTS 
In this brief we shall adopt the same terminology 
as employed in appellant's brief in referring to the 
parties. 
We do not believe that the statement of facts set 
forth in plaintiff's brief, fully reflects the material facts, 
and we therefore deem it necessary to enlarge upon it. 
Deceased Marion Duncan sustained fatal injuries as a 
result of an automobile collision which occurred about 
7:30A.M. on August 27, 1958 (R. 128, 138, 172-174). The 
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accident occurred in Main Street, approximately in front 
of Duncan's home. (R. 138, 203-205). The point of 
the accident was approximately midway between Main 
Street's intersections with 13th South Street and Cleve-
land Avenue. (R. 134-135, 146). There was no pedestrian 
crosswalk at the point where the accident occurred, nor 
in the near vicinity thereof. (R. 134, 146). In fact, the 
nearest cross-walks were at the intersections above 
named. (R. 146). 
On plaintiff's case in chief, she offered absolutely 
no evidence as to how the accident occurred. The only 
testimony of any kind offered by the plaintiff on her 
case in chief, which in any way even suggested any 
negligence on the part of defendant Hecker, was the 
testimony of the witness Lorin Kelly, as to a fragment 
of a conversation which he heard between his wife and 
the defendant Hecker. Kelly testified that he heard 
Hecker tell his wife "I didn't see him." (R. 130, 133). 
On cross-examination Kelly admitted that his wife had 
told him that Hecker had said that he (decedent) walked 
right into the side of the car. He also adn1itted that Iris 
wife had testified on deposition that Hecker had said 
decedent "ran" into the side of his car. (R. 13-±). 
Upon this scrap of evidence alone, plaintiff relies 
for a recovery against the defendants. There ''Tas no 
evidence in the record whatsoeYer that deceased was ever 
in a position where he could or should have been observed 
by Hecker, in time to avoid a collision. At the conclusion 
of plaintiff's case, defendants moved for a directed ver-
dict, which motion was denied without prejudice. (R. 168). 
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Defendants then offered the testin1ony of defendant 
Hecker, who was the only surviving eye witness to the 
accident, and whose testimony describing the accident is 
found on pages 172 to 176 of the record. Hecker's testi-
mony may be summarized as follows : 
On the morning of the accident, he had left his home 
at approxin1ately 7 :15 A.M. in a car furnished to him 
both for personal and business use by his employer. (R. 
154, 160, 172). At the place of the accident, and for son1e 
distance prior thereto, he was proceeding northerly along 
Main Street at a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour. (R. 
172, 173). He was traveling in the right hand lane for 
north bound traffic. (R. 172). At the place where the 
accident occurred, Main Street was a four lane highway, 
two lanes for north bound traffic and two lanes for south 
bound traffic. (R. 172). Hecker described the accident as 
follows: 
"A.. Well, as near as I can fix it in my 
mind, as I was going north on l\1ain Street there 
was a car directly in front of me in the same 
lane of traffic that I was traveling, there was 
another car on my left going in the same direc-
tion slightly ahead of me, and just traveling 
along under our normal speed in going to work. 
And all at once why there was a car on my left 
started to slow down, and I immediately noted 
that so I started to slow too, and at the same 
time I noticed the lights flash from the car di-
rectly in head of me so I started to apply my 
brakes, and as I got closer why I had to apply 
my brakes harder because the car directly in 
front of me had almost come to a stop, and at 
the time that I almost got stopped, that is I was 
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sliding my wheels at the time this man came 
right over the front of the car on my left. 
"Q. When you say 'this man' -
"A. Mr. Duncan is known. 
"Q. All right. 
"A. Came over the fender of this other car. 
"Q. When you say the 'came over the fen-
der' can you describe a little bit what you mean 
by that expression~ 
"A. Well, I can hardly explain it in this 
way, I seen the man just as he came off the fen-
der of the car, and that is the first time that I 
had seen him. 
"Q. Was he crawling or climbing~ 
"A. No, he was just coming at me from off 
the other car. I couldn't tell whether - I just 
glimpsed at him as he came off of that car, and 
by that time he struck. I didn't have no time to 
determine whether he had been running or what." 
Decedent's head struck the windshield on the extreme 
left side. (Ex. D-9, R. 154, 175). Hecker stopped within 
a few feet. (R. 176, 212). When got out of his car, the 
injured n1an was lying near the left rear corner of the 
car. (R. 176). Both the car which had been traveling at 
Hecker's left, and the car which had been preceding him, 
left the scene of the accident, and the respective drivers 
never idntified themselves. (R. 177). 
Hecker's version of the accident is corroborated by 
certain circumstantial evidence. It w·as stipulated that 
the deceased had a broken shin bone and a gouge n1ark 
in the front part of his right leg 14¥2 inches above the 
heel, and that there was a scuff or brush n1ark ·on the 
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sole of the right shoe. (R. 169, 170, 193, Ex. 2). This 
strongly suggests an impact on decedent's lower right 
leg. However, neither Hecker nor any of the innurner-
able policemen who examined the Hecker automobile 
discovered any damage to it, except the shattered wind-
shield. (R. 213-214, 230-231). Careful investigation and 
examination of the front of the car and bun1per, failed 
to reveal any dents, broken glass, or any blood, bits of 
flesh, or clothing, or any other indicia of irnpact. (R. 158, 
212-214, 230-231). It may fairly be inferred, therefore, 
that the injury to the lower leg was sustained in son1e 
manner, other than by collision with the Hecker car. 
The glasses of deceased were found intact about ten 
feet in front of the Hecker automobile, and were subse-
quently returned to plaintiff by the police. (R. 147, 150, 
179, 180). This also strongly suggests that deceased was 
struck, and his glasses knocked off before his head came 
into collision with the Hecker automobile. It should also 
be observed that immediately after the accident Hecker 
started a search for witnesses. (R. 178-179). This is not 
what a guilty individual would do. 
By way of rebuttal testimony, plaintiff attempted to 
show that there were no other cars moving along with 
the Hecker automobile. Plaintiff also attempted to de-
stroy Hecker's testimony by proof of statements made 
by him at the time of the accident, which differed in some 
details from his testimony at trial. However, since the 
verdict was in defendants' favor all conflicts in evidence 
must be resolved in their favor. 
Plaintiff also offered as rebuttal testimony, the testi-
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mony of investigating police officers as to skid marks, 
etc., which testimony was offered for the purpose of 
attempting to prove speed on the part of Hecker. (R. 
209). This testimony was properly rejected by the court, 
upon objection of defendants, since plaintiff had claimed 
speed as a ground of negligence against defendants, and 
any evidence with respect thereto should have been pre-
sented as part of plaintiff's case in chief. (R. 33). 
In summary, the only evidence as to how the accident 
happened is the testimony of Hecker himself. This testi-
mony exonerates defendants from any liability, since it 
shows that deceased was first struck by another vehicle 
and was then thrown into collision ·with the Hecker auto\ 
mobile, and that nothing that Hecker could have done 
could have avoided the second collision, after the danger 
thereof became apparent. As heretofore noted, the testi-
Inony of Hecker is supported by circumstantial evidence. 
If the testimony of Hecker is rejected, and found to 
be unworthy of belief, there is N 0 evidence before the 
court as to how the accident happened, and therefore no 
evidence on which a claim of negligence against defend-
ants could be based. The 1nost that could be said for 
plaintiff's evidence would be that there would be evidence 
to show that at the time of the accident, there were no 
cars proceeding northerly in front of or at the side of 
Hecker's automobile. If that be believed, it not only fails 
to make a case of negligence against Hecker, but n1akes a 
clear case of contributory negligence against the de-
ceased. Certainly if the I-Iecker car was approaching with 
no other vehicles in front of it or at its side, to obstruct 
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deceased's view of it, deceased was clearly guilty of 
negligence in walking or running into it. If the deceased 
was not struck by another car before collision with the 
Hecker car, the physical evidence shows without dispute, 
that the collision would have resulted from his running 
into the side of Hecker's car, since the only damage to it~ 
was that created by the collision of deceased's head with 
the windshield. Such damage could hardly have resulted 
from a frontal collision. 
It should also be noted here that plaintiff's own 
testimony shows without dispute that deceased had very 
poor vision when not aided by glasses. (R. 148). Another 
very reasonable and plausible explanation of this acci-
dent was that deceased may have lost his glasses as he 
ran across the stre-et, and not being able to see well, he 
may, as a result of such impaired vision, have run into 
the pathway of the Hecker car, when it was so close that 
a collision could not be avoided. 
Plaintiff is on the horns of this dilemn1a : Either the 
accident occurred as Hecker testified, in which event 
there would be no negligence on his part, since plaintiff 
was not seen in sufficient time to avoid a collision, be-
cause of the view being obstructed by other vehicles; or 
else the cause of the accident is left to pure speculation 
and conjecture. In either event, plaintiff cannot recover. 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF DEFENDANTS, AND FOR WANT OF SUCH 
EVIDENCE THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A 
VERDICT IN THEIR FAVOR. 
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POINT II 
IF DECEASED WAS NOT GUILTY OF ·CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS AT 
LEAST AN ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
JURY FINDING OF THAT FACT. 
POINT III 
'THE EVIDENCE RE•CEIVED BY THE COURT ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF LORIN KELLY OVER PLAIN-
TIFF'S OBJECTION, WAS ADMISSIBLE AND WAS PROP-
ERLY RECEIVED. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUC-
TION ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE. THE INSTRUCTION 
GIVEN BY THE COUR'T ON THAT DOCTRINE WAS IN 
PRINCIPLE AND WAS MORE THAN PLAINTIFF WAS EN-
TITLED TO RECEIVE. 
POINT V 
THE .COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S PROFERRED EVIDENCE OF SKID MARKS ON 
REBUTTAL. 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT 
HECKER WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT WITH THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT A'T 
THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. EVEN IF THERE WAS 
SUCH EVIDENCE, IT WOULD BE IMMA1TERIAL ON AP-
PEAL, SINCE THE JURY FOUND NO LIABILITY ON THE 
PART OF HECKER. 
POINT VII 
'THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE 
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES WERE ADEQUATE. 
POINT VIII 
THE APPEAL AS AGAINST HARTFORD ACCIDENT & 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, NOT HAVING BEEN ARGUED OR 
BRIEFED, IS WAIVED. 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendants having prevailed in the court below, 
they are entitled to have the evidence surveyed in the 
light most favorable to them. Morey v. Rodberg, 7 Ut. 
2d 299, 323 P2d 717; Hadley v. Wood, (Ut.), 345 P2d 197. 
Viewed, in this light, the evidence cornpels the affir-
mance of the judgment below. 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF DEFENDANTS, AND FOR WANT OF SUCH 
EVIDENCE THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A 
VERDICT IN THEIR FAVOR. 
As we have noted in our statement of facts, the only 
testimony in the record as to how the accident occurred 
is the testimony of the defendant Hecker, himself. That 
testimony completely exonerates the defendants frorn 
any negligence. If that testimony is rejected as unworthy 
of belief there is no evidence left in the record upon 
which the jury could make a finding as to how the acci-
dent occurred. The plaintiff had the burden of proving 
negligence on the part of defendants and wholly failed 
to produce any evidence to prove a prilna facie case. Her 
attempted destruction of the testimony of Hecker does 
not in any wise tend to establish a set of facts upon 
which she can recover. On this state of the record there 
is nothing on which to base a finding of negligence and 
the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor 
of defendants. 
As stated 1n 5A Am. J ur. 523, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic, Sec. 450 : 
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"'-Generally, it has been held that the owner 
or driver of an autornobile is not liable for injuries 
to a pedestrian received when such pedestrian 
collided with the side of the automobile, either 
upon the ground that the driver is not guilty of 
negligence or upon the ground that the injured 
pedestrian was guilty of contributory negligence." 
If the court finds that we are correct in this point, 
it is unnecessary to consider any other points, and judg-
ment for the defendants should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
IF DECEASED WAS NOT GUILTY OF ·CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS AT 
LEAST AN ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
JURY FINDING OF THAT FACT. 
We answer here plaintiff's points 2, 3, and 4. 
A. UNDER WELL ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW, DE-
CEASED WAS GUILTY OF ·CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Sec. 57-7-143, U.C.A., 1953, provides, insofar as lna-
terial here, as follows: 
" (a). Every pedestrian crossing a roadway 
at any point other than within a 1narked cross-
walk or within an un1narked crosswalk at an inter-
section shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles 
upon the roadway." 
The evidence in this case shows ''ithout dispute that 
at the point where the accident occurred there \Yas no 
pedestrian crosswalk. It was approxll:nately half wa:T 
between two well defined intersections. Clearly, deceased 
was not in a cross-walk; and if the accident happened in 
any way other than testified by Hecker, he (deceased,) 
1nust have violated the foregoing statute, and b3T reason 
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thereof, he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
The general rule in this regard is set forth in 38 Am. 
Jur., pages 877 and 878, Negligence, Sec. 196, as follows: 
"The general rule is that the violation by the 
plaintiff of a statute or ordinance prohibiting 
acts which endangered him constitutes a defense 
in an action for negligence, or at any rate, con-
stitutes a prima facie case of contributory negli-
gence which will preclude a recovery by the 
plaintiff unless rebutted, provided the prohibition 
of the statute or ordinance is intended to apply 
for the benefit of the defendant in the situation 
wherein the plaintiff was injured, and the viola-
tion of the law is a proximate cause of the injury. 
One who has violated a safety statute laying 
down a rule of conduct cannot be heard to say 
that he exercised ordinary care or could not have 
anticipated injury from its violation, unless com-
pliance with the statute was impossible under the 
circumstances or would have subjected him to 
other imminent and apparent dangers. A causal 
violation of a statute puts the offender in the 
class of those who fail to obey legal rules for 
conduct, when he seeks to recover for the negli-
gence of another." 
That rule has been consistently followed by this 
Court in a long line of decisions dating from earliest 
times: 
Smith v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., (Utah), 88 
Pac. 683. 
Jensen v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., (Utah), 132 
Pac. 8. 
Newton v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., (Utah), 134 
Pac. 567. 
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Shortino v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., (Utah), 174 
Pac. 860. 
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., (Utah), 69 Pac. 
(2d) 502. 
Graham v. Johnson, (Utah), 166 Pac. (2d) 230. 
North v. Cartwright, (Utah), 229 Pac. (2d) 871. 
Hayden v. Cederlund, (Ut.), 263 P2d 796. 
The rule has been applied frequently in situations 
like the one here, where a pedestrian has undertaken to 
cross a busy street in violation of the foregoing statute. 
In fact, a long line of decisions starting with Reid v. 
Owens, 98 Ut. 50, 93 P2d 680, have held the pedestrian 
guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law. 
In Mingus v. Olsson, (Utah), 201 Pac. (2d) 495, 
involving a pedestrian who was assu1ned to be in a 
cross-walk, the court said: 
"There can be no doubt that a pedestrian 
who undertakes to cross a busy street of a large 
city, without first observing for vehicular traffic 
is guilty of contributory negligence. And this is 
true, even though he may be crossing in a cross-
walk, and have the right of ·way. * * * The rights 
of pedestrians to the use of the public streets 
are the same as those of a n1otorist - neither 
greater nor less. Hence, the sa1ne general duties 
devolve upon then1. * * * Of course \Ye do not n1ean 
to in1ply that a n1ere glance in the direction of the 
approaching autmnobile \Yould suffice. The duty 
to look has inherent in it the duty to see what 
there is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it." 
In Sant v. liiiUer, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. (2d) 719, 
a pedestrian atte1npting to cross a street not in a pedes-
trian cross-walk, and crossing in a diagonal fashion, 
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(as was deceased here), was held guilty of contributory 
negligence as a Inatter of law. 
In Cox v. Thompson, (litah), 25± Pac. (2d) 1047, 
this court said : 
"Contributory negligence becomes a question 
of law when from the facts reasonable men can 
draw but one inference and that inference points 
unerringly to the negligence of decedent as con-
tributory to his death. * * * 
* * * 
'•* * * Crossing a highway at a point where 
there was no marked crosswalk, decedent was 
duty bound to yield the right of way to a vehicle 
upon the roadway. See 41-6-79, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. This he failed to do. fie, in addition, 
apparently failed to look, or having looked failed 
to see what he should have seen and paid heed 
to it. I-le said nothing and did nothing which indi-
cated he was in any way aware of the danger 
presented. Decedent was properly found negligent 
as a matter of law. See Mingus v. Olsson, supra.'' 
In Smith vs. Bennett, (Utah), 265 Pac. (2d) 401, 
this court said : 
"Plaintiff's failure to see and yield the right 
of way to defendant's automobile only a few feet 
away in a position of immediate danger consti-
tutes contributory negligence which caused her 
InJUries .... 
"* * * In the instant case there was but one 
demand upon plaintiff's attention. There is no 
room for reasonable difference of opinion as to 
where her attention should have been concen-
trated· it was incumbent upon her to observe the 
condition of approaching traffic. That she failed 
to use due care in doing so is rnanifest from the 
evidence." 
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See also Gittens vs. Lundberg, (Utah), 284 Pac. (2d) 
1115, and Fox v. Taylor, (Utah), No. 9122 (not yet 
reported). 
B. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS, IF IT 
DOES NOT COMPEL, A FINDING OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE. 
Even if it cannot be said as a matter of law that 
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, the evi-
dence certainly amply justifies a finding to that effect 
The language of this court in the recent case of Holmes 
v. He~derbrecht, (Utah), 348 P. (2d) 565, is singularly 
appropriate here: 
"From the facts shown it appears likely that 
the defendant was close enough to the plaintiff 
when she walked into the path of his automobile 
that reasonable care for her own safety would 
have dictated that she stop and permit him to 
pass. The question whether she used the care 
which an ordinary, reasonable person would have 
done for her own safety in that regard was sub-
mitted to the jury. A consideration of all of the 
instructions together as they must be, indicates 
that the issues, both of the defendant's negligence 
and the plaintiff's contributory negligence, were 
fully and fairly presented to the jury and in such 
a manner that no confusion would result there-
from.'' 
C. THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE UPON THE 
PART OF A PERSON KILLED IN AN ACCIDENT HAS NO 
APPLI,CATION HERE. 
Plaintiff seeks to take refuge in the fmniliar pre-
sumption that a person killed in an accident is presumed 
to be in the exercise of due care for his own safety, 
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in the absence of evidence to the contr;·ary. Plaintiff over-
looks completely the qualification of the rule. It is well 
settled that this presurnption has no application where 
there is testimony as to the facts leading up to the 
accident and as to the conditions surrounding the acci-
dent. In Ryan vs. Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah), 151 
Pac. 71, this court laid down the rule as follows : 
"In the absence of evidence there is a pre-
sumption that the deceased used due care, and, 
for his protection did all that reasonably was 
required of him. * * * When, however, facts and 
circumstances are proven to show just what the 
deceased did, or failed to do, then his oare, or the 
want of it, is to be determined, not on the: pre-
sumption, but upon the facts and circumstances 
proven. That is, whenever the facts or circum-
stances are shown concerning which the presump-
tion is indulged, the presumption ceases a>nd the 
controversy is to be decided by the weight of the 
evidence adduced." (Emphasis ours.) 
The rule has been consistently followed. See Perrin, 
v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Utah), 201 Pac. 405. 
In Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co., (Utah), 
275 Pac. 582, this court said: 
"'The presumption that the deceased, in the 
absence or independently of evidence, used due 
care and did all that prudence required, is but 
an application of the general rule of law that 
all persons charged with negligence are, in the 
absence of evidence, presumed to have exercised 
due care, and that the burden is cast on him 
who asserts negligence to establish it by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The presumption 
applies, not only to a person since deceased, but 
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to a plaintiff and to a defendant as well, when 
charged with negligence. When evidence or facts 
and circumstances were adduced respecting the 
charged negligence of the deceased, the plaintiff, 
in determining the ultimate fact of such negli-
gence or the want of it, has no more right to have 
the presumption considered as of evidentiary force 
or effect and to have it cast on the scales and 
weighed and considered in connection with proven 
facts and circumstances bearing on the question 
than had the defendant when evidence was ad-
duced respecting its charged negligence to have 
the presumption as to it cast on the scales and 
considered as of evidentiary force and effect." 
( E1nphasis ours.) 
In Aiingtts v. Olsson, (Utah), 201 Pac. (2d) 495, this 
court said: 
"Plaintiff relies on an asserted presumption 
that deceased was, at the time of his injury, in 
the exercise of due care for his own safety. It is 
true that in certain death cases, there is a pre-
sumption that decedent was in the exercise of 
due care for his own safety. But there is no room 
for such a presumption where, as here, there was 
positive evidence not only as to the fatal accident 
itself, but to the. conduct of decedent leadtng up 
to the fatal accident. ' Such a presumption must 
give \Yay to the positive evidence adduced." 
(E1nphasis ours). 
To the san1e effect see J(ing v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western R. Co., (Utah), 211 Pac. (2d) 833. 
In the case of Compton vs. Ogden Union Ravlway 
Depot Company, (Utah), 235 Pac. (2d) 515, cited and 
relied upon by the plaintiff, this court said: 
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"The presumption is applicable where there 
is no evidence as to the care used, or perhaps 
where the evidence con1es from an adverse witness 
who n1ay be subject to disbelief by the jury, or 
where there is sufficient uncertainty in the evi-
dence as to cast doubt on the testimony. It has 
no application where, as here, the deceased is 
observed dun,'ng the per~od prior to and at the 
t~me she is . fatally injured and the witness is 
avaliable and testified. * * * 
"It seems inescapable that the deceased was 
guilty of contributory negligence. It was her duty 
to look and listen for trains before going on the 
tracks. She had a clear view of the tracks to the 
north, well before she got far enough west to 
be in the path of the train. Under the evidence 
the engine was there to be seen. If decedent had 
looked at any time, either as she started, or as 
she pursued a course parallel to, but dangerously 
near the tracks, she must necessarily have seen 
the train approaching. She was, therefore, either 
negligent in failing to look or in failing to heed 
the train if she saw it.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
See also Tuttle vs. Pacific Intermountain Express 
Co., (Utah), 242 Pac. (2d) 764, and Cox v. Thompson, 
(Utah), 254 Pac. (2d) 1047. 
In JJfecham v. Allen, (Utah), 262 Pac. (2d) 285, this 
court said: 
"From the basic fact that a human being was 
accidentally killed a presumption arises which 
requires the trier of the facts to assume the pre-
sumed facts, that decedent used due care for his 
own safety, in the absence of a prima facie show-
ing to the contrary, but in this kind of a presump-
tion upon the making of such showing, the pre-
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surnption disappears from and becomes wholly 
inoperative in the case, and the trial from then on 
should proceed exactly the same as though no 
presumption ever existed, or had any effect on 
the case." 
See also the language of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania in the case of Rank v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., 370 Pa. 107, 97 A2d 198, where the court said: 
"The material facts in this case are undis-
puted and duly explain the happening. The pre-
sumption that a person who has lost his life 
exercised due care is not applicable where the 
plaintiff's own testinwny clearly established the 
decedent's negligence. Weldon, Adm'x vs. Pitts-
burgh Railway Company, 352 Pa. 103, 41 A2d 
856; Simmonds v. Penn Fruit Company, 354 Pa. 
154, 4 7 A2d 231. The instinct of self preservation 
upon which the presumption is founded, was con-
spicuously absent here. The decedent's unfortun-
ate death was caused by his own unjustifiable 
conduct.'' 
It should also be pointed out, that even in cases 
where the presumption is available, it does no n1ore than 
relieve the deceased of contributory negligence, and doe8 
not give rise to an inference of negligence on the part 
of the defendant, which still n1ust be proved by positive 
evidence. In 16 An1. J ur., pages :207-8, the rule is stated 
as follows: 
"Negligence on the part of the person in-
jured and killed is ordinarily not presumed; he 
is presu1ned, on the contrary, to have exercised 
due care for his own safety at the tilne of his 
injnry. This presumption is indulged, ho·wever, 
only to relieve a plaintiff fr01n an inference of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UJ 
negligence and not to supply evidence of the 
negligence of a defendant. :Moreover, the circunl-
stances surrounding the rnishap may be such as 
to rebut the presumption of due care and even 
to raise a presurnption of contributory negli-
gence on the part of the person killed." 
In the court's instruction No. 1-± (R. 89), the jury 
was advised that deceased was presun1ed to be in the 
exercise of due care for his own safety, unless it was 
"pursuaded frorn a preponderance of the evidence" that 
he was guilty of contributory negligence. Under the 
evidence adduced, the instruction was considerably rnore 
than plaintiff was entitled to have, and she is in no 
position to complain. The error, if any, was in her favor. 
POINT III 
'THE EVIDENCE RE:CEIVED BY THE COURT ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF LORIN KELLY OVER PLAIN-
TIFF'S OBJECTION, WAS ADMISSIBLE AND WAS PROP-
ERLY RECEIVED. 
vVe answer here, plaintiff's Point I. 
It is interesting to note that plaintiff cites no auth-
ority in support of her contention that the court erred 
in permitting the witness Kelly, to answer, over objection, 
questions propounded to him on cross-exarnination. Had 
plaintiff's counsel made an examination of the la\\·, \H~ 
do not believe that this point would now be urged by 
plaintiff. 
On direct examination of the witness l(elly, plain-
tiff developed evidence as to a fragment of a conversation 
overheard by the witness between the defendant I-Iecker 
and Kelly's wife. The only portion heard by the witness 
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was that I-Iecker said to his wife "I didn't even see 
him.'' We assumed that this evidence was offered again;:;t 
Hecker as an extra judicial achnission against interest. 
liowever, plaintiff having opened the door, defendant 
was entitled to develop by cross examination the entire 
conversation. The rule is stated in 20 Am. J ur. 463 and 
464, Evidence, Sec. 551, as follows : 
"If a statement is adrnissible in evidence as 
an adn1ission or declaration, it is admissible as 
an entirety, including parts that are unfavorable, 
as well as those that are favorable to the party 
offering it in evidence. In the event a statement 
admitted in evidence constitutes part of a conver-
sation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled 
to have placed in evidence all that was said or 
written by or to the declarant in the course of 
such conversation or correspondence, provided 
the other statements have some bearing upon, or 
connection with, the admission or declaration in 
evidence and are not excluded by a rule of law 
other than the hearsay rule." (Emphasis ours.) 
See also 58 Am. J ur. 350, Witnesses, Sec. 629, as 
follows: 
"Of course, it is error for the trial court to 
refuse to permit the cross-examination of a ·wit-
ness to extend to all matters gennane to the direct 
examination for such a cross-examination is a 
matter of absolute right and is not a mere privil-
ege; but under the majority American rule a 
witness rnay not be asked any question on cross-
examination which does not tend to rebut, im-
peach, rnodify, or explain any of his testimony." 
Also at page 351, Sec. 630, it is said: 
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"The rule should be liberally construed so as 
to permit on cross exa1nination any question which 
reasonably tends to explain, contradict or dis-
credit any te.stimony given by the witnes; in chief, 
or to test h1s accuracy, 1nenwry, veracity, char-
acter, or credibility." (Emphasis ours.) 
And at page 353, Sec. 635, it is further said: 
"'Where some part of a conversation is intro-
duced in evidence during the examination in chief, 
the whole of the conversation referring to the 
same subject matter 1nay be adduced on the cross-
examination." 
See also page 360, Sec. G-11, where it is said: 
"When a subject is opened by the direct ex-
amination, the cross-examining counsel may go 
fully into the details thereof, and is not confined 
to the particular part of it embodied within the 
questions asked on direct examination.'' 
The rule is stated thus in YII \Vignwre on I~~vidence 
523, § 2113: 
''For the reasons already sufficiently exam-
ined .. the opponent, against whom part of an 
utterance has been put in, may, in his turn, 
complement it by putting in the remainder, in 
order to secure for the tribunal a complete under-
standing of the total tenor and effect of the utter-
ance .... But there is and could be no difference 
of opinion as to the opponent's right, if a part 
only has been put in, himself to put in the re-
ma~"nder .. . 
"This right of the opponent to put in the 
remainder is universally conceded, for every kind 
of utterance without distinction; and the only 
question can be as to the scope and limits of the 
right." (Sic.) 
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rrhe sarne author at page 529, Sec. 2115 says: 
"The general phrasing of the principle, then, 
is that when any part of an oral statement has 
been put in evidence by one party, the opponent 
may afterwards (on cross-examination or re-
examination) put in the remainder of what was 
said on the same subject at the same time .... 
"Its most common application is to conversa-
tions in general, including the admission of an 
opponent and to inconsistent statements of a wit-
ness used in impeachment; here it may be noted 
that a conversation in a party's presence is in 
effect merely one form of an admission, because 
statements in a party's presence are usually eqiva-
lent to adrnissions by him." 
See also Vol. IV, § 1059 at p. 24. 
The reasons for the rule are clearly and succinctly 
explained in 3 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 1957, 
§ 1063, as follows : 
"Broad statements repeatedly occur in every-
day speech which, taken by themselves, have a 
much wider, and sometimes a wholly different, 
meaning than when considered in connection with 
the entire conversation in which they occur or 
with precedent or subsequent qualifications made 
by the speaker. It would obviously be unfair in 
such instances to isolate, as alone adrnissible, those 
portions of a conversation n1ost darnaging to the 
speaker. l-Ienee it is the well-settled rule that the 
whole of a declaration or staternent containing 
an adn1ission should be received together. This 
rule is stated, in the language of Mr. Justice Field, 
thus: 'Every admission upon which a party relies 
is to be taken as an entirety of the fact which 
n1akes for his side, with the 'qualifications which 
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lirnit, n1odify, or destroy its effect on the other 
side.' This is now a settled principle which has 
passed, by its universality, into an axiom of the 
law. Best lays down the rule as follows: 
•· 'Where part of a staternent is used as self-
harming evidence against a party, he has a right 
to have the whole of it laid before the jury who 
rnay then consider and attach what weight they 
see fit to any self-serving statements it contains.''' 
It would be rnanifestly unfair to permit plaintiff to 
develop evidence as to a fragment of a conversation, 
and then to take refuge in the hearsay rule in an atten1pt 
to prevent the triers of the facts from learning the full 
conversation. The law, as above set forth, clearly does 
not countenance such practice. Plaintiff having intro-
duced the subject, defendant was entitled to show by 
cross-examination of the same witness the full conversa-
tion, and the hearsay objection is not available to plain-
tiff to prevent the facts from being proven. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUC-
TION ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE. THE INSTRUCTION 
GIVEN BY THE COURT ON THAT DOCTRINE WAS COR-
RECT IN PRINCIPLE AND WAS MORE THAN PLAINTIFF 
WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE. 
vVe here answer plaintiff's Point V. 
A. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 'TO WARRANT THE 
GIVING OF AN INSTRUCTION ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
A complete answer to plaintiff's contention is found 
in the recent case of Fox vs. Taylor) #9122, recently 
decided by this court, but not yet reported. In that case, 
a plaintiff atte1npting to cross a busy street at a place 
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other than in a .cross-walk was struck by defendant's 
automobile. ]'rom a verdict and judg1nent in favor of the 
defendant, plaintiff appealed, clain1ing, among other 
things, that she was entitled to an instruction on last 
clear chance. This court, speaking through Justice 
Crockett, unani1nously held: 
"The cases where that doctrine is applicable 
fall into two distinct categories. See Sec. 479 and 
480, Restatement of Torts. The first we here con-
sider relates to situations where both the defend-
ant and the plaintiff are guilty of continuing 
negligence, and where the plaintiff could, by 
exercising due care, avoid the peril at any time 
up to the 1noment of injury. In such case the 
injury is the result of the concurring negligence 
of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Under 
those facts the defendant can be held responsible 
only if he actually knows of the plaintiff's situa-
tion of peril in time to have the 'last clear chance' 
to avoid the harm, and fails to do so. Ibid; see 
Sec. 480, Restatement of Torts; see concurring 
opinion, Wade, J., Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah, 
505, 511, 201 P. 2d 495. Otherwise the negligence 
of one would be just as much the proximate cause 
of the injury as the other's. The facts here do 
not fall within the above pattern because there 
is no evidence that the defendant actually knew 
of plaintiff's situation until too late to avoid 
striking her. 
"The plaintiff insists, however, that the doc-
trine of last clear chance is applicable and the 
defendant should be held liable even if he did not 
actually know of her peril because in the exercise 
of due care he should have observed and avoided 
striking her. The contention involves considera-
tion of the other facet of the doctrine of last 
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clear chance. \Vhere the defendant does not actu-
ally know of the plaintiff's situation of peril, the 
doctrine can only properly be applied where the 
plaintiff has gotten into a position of inextricable 
peril. An illustration of this is where a person 
has caught his foot in a railroad switch, or is in 
some other sirnilar predicament, so that he is 
thereafter unable to avert the injury. In such a 
situation, the plaintiff's negligence has come to 
rest and it is not at the time of the impact an 
active concurring proxin1ate cause of the injury. 
In such circumstances the defendant rnay be held 
responsible if he either knows or in the exercise 
of reasonable care should know of the plaintiff's 
helpless situation in time to avoid the injury and 
fails to do so. Ibid; see Sec. 479, Restaternent of 
Torts. This is so because the defendant's later 
negligence, after the plaintiff's negligence has 
come to rest, is deemed to be the sole proximate 
cause of the injury. 
"In regard to the application of this principle, 
the plaintiff here is faced with a dilemma; she 
was either in inextricable peril or she was not. 
If she was not in inextricable peril, then at any 
instant up to the ti1ne she got into such predica-
ment, by the exercise of reasonable care, she 
could have observed the oncmning car and have 
avoided being hit. On the other hand, she could 
only have gotten into inextricable peril by getting 
into the path of the defendant's car, and her peril 
could be considered inextricable only if the de-
fendant was then too close to avoid striking her. 
Thus, by the very description of the situation, 
he did not have the 'last clear chance' to avoid 
the injury. As the phrase indicates, it must be a 
fair and clear opportunity and not a mere pos-
sibility that the collision could have been avoided. 
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Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P. 2d 231. 
It is our conclusion that the trial court was cor-
rect in refusing to submit the case upon the 
doctrine of last clear chance.'' 
The foregoing language of this court appears to be 
fully applicable to the facts in the case at bar. 
Another recent case wherein this court held that a 
pedestrian crossing out of the cross-walk was not entitled 
to an instruction on last clear chance, was Cox v. Thomp-
son, 254 Pac. 2d 1047. This court there said, at page 105:2: 
"
1The last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable 
in the present instance. In order for the question 
of last clear chance to be properly submitted to 
a jury the evidence must be such as would in 
all probability reasonably support a finding that 
there was a fair and clear opportunity, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, to avoid the injury. 
It would not be sufficient that it appear from 
hindsight that by some possible measure the de-
fendant by the 'skin of his teeth' could have 
avoided the injury. See M or by v. Rogers, Utah, 
252 p. 2d 231. 
* * * 
"Thus the matter was properly withheld from 
the jury if the evidence, taken in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably 
and clearly support a finding that (a) defendant 
knew of decedent's situation of danger, and (b) 
realized or had reason to realize that plaintiff 
was inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril 
in ti1ne to avoid har1u, and (c) the defendant was 
thereafter negligent in failing to utilize with 
reasonable care and competence his then existing 
ability to avoid harn1ing decedent." 
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B. IF PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUC-
TION ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE, THE INSTRUCTION 
GIVEN BY THE COURT ADEQUATELY AND ACCURATELY 
ADVISED 'THE JURY CONCERNING IT. 
The record in this case is con1pletely devoid of any 
evidence that defendant had a fair and clear opportunity 
to avoid the accident after plaintiff's position of peril 
was apparent, or should have been apparent to Hecker 
in the exercise of reasonable care. However, if it be 
considered that plaintiff was entitled to such an instruc-
tion, it does not appear that there was any error in 
the instruction given by the court. The instruction re-
quested by plaintiff was substantially the language of 
Sec. 480 of the A.L.l. Restate1nent of Torts. The language 
of the instruction given by the court \vas taken sub-
stantially verbatim fr01n J.I.F.U., Sec. 17.20. After a 
careful comparison of the hvo instructions, we are unable 
to detect any n1aterial differences between then1. 
It appears that the gist of plaintiff's objection to the 
court's instruction, is that set forth in paragraph 2 
thereof, which reads as follows: 
"2. That he was, by reason of inattention or lack 
of proper alertness ,totally unaware of the peril 
that threatened him.'' 
vVe believe that this condition is irnplicit in the 
(b) paragraph of plaintiff's requested instruction pro-
viding "that the plaintiff was inattentive, and therefore 
unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the hann." 
That inattention or lack of alertness is an essential 
element, and in fact the very basis of the doctrine under 
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the situation envisioned in Sec. 480 of the Restatement, 
is made absolutely clear by the com1nent follo"\ving that 
section in the Restatement. It is there said: 
"This section states the rule under which a 
plaintiff, who could have made timely discovery 
of his peril if he had been on the alert, can re-
cover notwithstanding his negligent inattent~on. 
In such a situation, the defendant has no reason 
to believe that he has the exclusive power to pre-
vent the harm unless he not only knows of the 
plaintiff's situation but realizes or has reason to 
realize that the plaint,iff does not know the peril 
of his sitt~ation and is, therefore, in a danger 
from which only the defendant's careful action 
can protect him. 
"* * * The defendant must also realize or 
have reason to realize that the plaivntiff is in-
attentive and, therefore, is in peril. * * * There-
fore, the defendant is liable only if he realizes or 
has reason to realize that the plaintiff i'S inatten-
tive and consequently in peril." (Emphasis ours.) 
The trial court should not be criticized, much less 
held in error, for choosing the language of an instruction 
carefully drafted by a cmnrnittee of recognized experts 
after mature consideration and deliberation, in prefer-
ence to the language of an instruction prepared by an 
advocate in the heat of battle. It is to be noted also, 
that in the plaintiff's request she cited in support thereof 
J.I.JJ\U., Sec. 17.20. She therefore apparently recognized 
and represented to the Court that the language of her 
request was essentially the sarne as the J.I.F.U. form. 
(\,rtainly, if there was error in the language of the 
court's charge, plaintiff is chargeable with having lead 
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the court into it, by virtue of having cited the J.I.:B,.U. 
fonn in support of plaintiff's own request. 
POINT V 
THE ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S PROFERRED EVIDENCE OF SKID MARKS ON 
REBUTTAL. 
We answer here plaintiff's Point VI. 
It appears from the pretrial order, that one of the 
grounds of negligence on which plaintiff intended to 
rely for a recovery against defendants, was excessive 
speed on the part of the defendant I-Iecker. This being 
so, under familiar principles of law, plaintiff should 
have offered on her case in chief any evidence which 
she had to support such a claim. No such evidence was 
offered. In fact, plaintiff was scrupulous to keep such 
evidence out of the record on her case in chief, and 
interposed objections when counsel for the defendant 
undertook to introduce that subject on cross-examination 
of defendant Hecker as part of plaintiff's case in chief. 
Only after defendant had rested ,did plaintiff con1e 
foreward and offer to prove the length of the skid rnarks 
left by the Hecker auton1obile as a basis for showing 
Hecker's speed in1mediately prior to the accident. Plain-
tiff made no attempt to show that the need for this 
testimony could not have been anticipated, and in view 
of her claim at pretrial, could not well have made such 
a showing. Neither did plaintiff undertake to show that 
Officer Begent was not available as a witness at th(~ 
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time her case in chief was presented. 1Ier only excuse 
for the belated offer of this testimony was that it tended 
to rebut the testimony of Hecker from which it was 
developed incidentally on his examination, that he was 
traveling about 25 to 30 miles an hour. 
A wide discretion is vested in the trial court in 
determining what evidence is adnrissible by way of re-
buttal, and that discretion ·will not be interfered with 
by the appellate court in the absence of a clear sho\Ying 
of abuse. The considerations which should guide the trial 
court in exercising this discretion and the rules with 
respect thereto, are set forth in 53 Am. Jur. commencing 
at page 101, Trial, commencing with Sec. 115 as follows: 
"While the trial court is vested with wide 
discretion in permitting departures from the 
usual order of proof when circumstances of the 
case require, the general rule is that the party 
who has the burden of proof - he who holds 
the affirmative and who would be defeated if no 
evidence were offered on either side- is entitled 
to open the evidence; he should then introduce all 
his evi:dence ~n chief, and after his adversary has 
introduced all his evidence in chief, the former 
should be confined to rebuttal evidence. Generally 
speaking, on rebuttal he can give only such evi-
dence in reply as tends to answer new matter 
introduced by his adversary. 
"If every party had a right to introduce evi-
dence at any time, at his own election, without 
reference to the stage of the trial in which it is 
offered, the proceedings of the court would often 
be embarrassed, the purposes of justice be ob-
structed, and the parties themselves be surprised 
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by evidence destructive of their rights, which they 
could not have foreseen or in any manner have 
guarded against. Although the rule regarding the 
order of evidence should be followed as far as 
practicable, it is not inflexible; the order of the 
evidence is necessarily governed by the trial 
judge. * * * Nevertheless, it i·s the duty of the 
parties to introduce thdr evidence in proper 
order, and if they fail to do so it vs discretionary 
with the court whether the evidence shall be ad-
mitted. * * * 
"* * * Whether there shall be a departure 
from the usual order of proof is a matter ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and an appellate court will interfere only where 
there is an abuse of discretion, as where the 
effect is to countenance or aid trickery or un-
fairness on the part of counsel." (Emphasis ours.) 
§ 120. "After the parties have introduced 
their evidence in chief they are as a general rule 
confined to rebuttal evidence that is, evidence 
which answers or disputes that given by the oppo-
site party - evidence in denial of some affirma-
tive case or fact which the adverse party has 
attempted to prove, - except as the trial court 
may in its discretion permit a party to introduce 
evidence which could have been given as part 
of the testimony in chief. One cannot, except in 
the diJscretion of the trial court, introduce as a 
part of hi~s rebuttal testtmony relative to new 
and independent facts competent as a part of his 
testimony in chief. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
§ 121. "As a general rule the party upon 
which the affirmative of an issue devolves vs 
bound to give all his evidence in support of the 
issue in the first instance, and wiU not be per-
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mitted to hold back part of his evidence confirma-
tory of his case and then offer it on rebuttal. 
Rebuttal testimony offered by the plaintiff should 
rebut the testimony brought out by the defendant 
and should consist of nothing which could have 
been offered in chief. * * * Nor, as a general 
rule will the discretion of the trial court in re-
fusing to permit evidence in chief to be introduced 
in rebuttal be interfered with, and in some juris-
dictions the appellate courts will not review this 
discretion. * * *'' (Emphasis ours.) 
Manifestly, there was no abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court when his ruling is viewed in light 
of the above principles. Plaintiff had every opportunity 
to present the proffered evidence on her case in chief. 
Obviously that was the proper place for it. It would be 
most unfair to a defendant to permit the plaintiff to 
hold back part of his evidence in chief in the guise of 
rebuttal evidence, simply because it had the incidental 
effect of rebutting some item of defendant's proof. Evi-
dence with respect to speed was a part of plaintiff's 
case in chief, and should have been offered at that time. 
The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
receive the proffered evidence at the end of the trial. 
Plaintiff also seeks to justify the belated offer on 
the grounds that the proffered evidence would help to 
establish a last clear chance situation, since it would 
show the distance deceased was from defendant Hecker, 
when first observed. However, the undisputed testimony 
of Hecker shows that brakes were initially applied be-
cause other rars n1oving in the san1e traffic pattern 
were slowing down, and decedent was not yet in sight. 
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first observed, what he was doing, or how he can1e into 
collision with the Hecker car. Counsel for plaintiff ex-
pressly stated that the evidence was offered . to prove 
speed. No other purpose was suggested. The objection 
to it was properly sustained. 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT 
HECKER WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT WITH THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT A'T 
THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. EVEN IF THERE WAS 
SUCH EVIDENCE, IT WOULD BE IMMA'TERIAL ON AP-
PEAL, SINCE THE JURY FOUND NO LIABILITY ON THE 
PART OF HECKER. 
We answer here plaintiff's POINT VII. 
In view of the fact that the jury found either non-
negligence on the part of the defendant liecker, or con-
tributory negligence on the part of deceased, or both, 
even if there was any error of the trial court in determin-
ing the issue of scope of employment, such error "\Yonld 
be wholly immaterial on this appeal, since plaintiff can-
not have been prejudicied thereby. However, there was 
no error in that regard. 
At the time of the accident defendant I-Iecker "\Yas 
operating an automobile owned by his employer and 
used by him both for business purposes and for his 
personal pleasure. At the time of the accident, IIecker 
was on his way from his home to his employer's office, 
preparatory to starting his day's work. l-Ie had no 
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errands or missions of any type to perform for his em-
ployer between his horne and the office. He would have 
no duties to perform for his e1nployer until he arrived 
at the office. The mere fact that his aut01nobile \vas 
furnished by his employer, and that the cost of operation 
was borne by his employer, did not mean that he was 
in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 
On the contrary, under familiar principles of agency 
law, well established by innumerable decisions of this 
court, he was not in the scope of his employment at the 
tirne the accident occurred. The rule is stated in the 
Restatement of the L.aw of Agency, Sec. 238, as follows: 
"Except as stated in §§ 212-214, a master is 
liable for harm caused by the use of instrumen-
talities entrusted by him to a servant only if they 
are used within the scope of employment." 
Under C01nment b thereunder, it is said: 
"The 1nere fact that the n1aster habitually 
allows the servant to use the instrumentality, or 
even that the master 1naintains the instrumen-
tality entirely for the use of the servant, does 
not of itself subject the master to liability. The 
master is liable only when the instrumentality 
is being used by the· servant for the purpose of 
advancing the employer's business or interests, 
as distinguished fr01n the private affairs of the 
servant. Thus, a 1naster who purchases an auto-
mobile for the convenience of his servants is not 
subject to liability when a servant is using it 
for his own purposes; nor is he liable if a group 
of servants, with his pennission use it for private 
purposes. * * * '' 
To the san1e effect see 35 An1. J ur., :Master and 
Servant, Sec. 580. 
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In a long line of industrial cases, Utah has adhered 
to this rule. See Greer v. Ind. Comm. of Utah, (Utah), 
~79 Pac. 900; F'ideUty & Castwlty Co. v. Ind. Comm., 
(Utah), 8 Pac. (2d) 617; Roberts v. Industrial C01nm., 
(Utah), 47 Pac. (2d) 1052; Vitagraph, Inc. v. Incl. C01n1n. 
(Utah), 85 Pac. (2d) 601; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. 1 nd. ComnL., CC tah), 110 Pac. (2d) 334; London (Inar-
antee & Accident Co. v. Frazee, (Utah), 185 Pac. (2d) 
284, and Wilson v. Industrial Com1n., (Utah), 207 Pac. 
(2d) 1116. 
Although the forego1ng cases were decided under the 
Workman's Compensation Act, there appears no reason 
why the same rule would not apply where an injured 
party seeks to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
As said by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case 
of Elli:s & Lewi's, Inc. v. Trimble, 67 Pac. (2d) 244, 
decided under anologous circumstances : 
"'The cases above cited are workmen's com-
pensation cases. But there can be no difference 
in legal principle on this account: It would be 
absurd to say, in applying liberally the work-
men's compensation laws, that one engaged in 
rendering such services was an independent con-
tractor and was not entitled to the benefits of the 
law for his own injuries; and, on the other hand 
to say, in similar circumstances, that he was a 
servant or agent of the one for whom he was 
rendering services, and could serve as a conduit 
to carry responsibility for his acts to the one for 
whom he was rendering services, and thereby 
enable a third person to be benefited for his 
injuries." 
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The issue was submitted to the jury, which was more 
than plaintiff was entitled to receive. I~ven if there 
were error, it would be immaterial and non-prejudicial 
in view of the jury's findings on the issues of negligence 
and contributory negligence. 
POINT VII 
'THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE 
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES WERE ADEQUATE. 
We here answer plaintiff's POIKT VIII.· 
Plaintiff complains that the court failed to give her 
requested instructions numbered 16 and 17, to the effect 
that a witness may be impeached by _evidence of incon-
sistent statements made on other occasions. While the 
court did not deal specifically with the effect of prior 
inconsistent statements, the court gave the jury a general 
and con1plete instruction regarding the credibility of 
witnesses in its Instruction No. 26. Mter advising the 
jury of various 1natters which n1ight be considered by the 
jurors in determining the credibility of the witnesses, 
the court advised the1n that they might also consider 
any fact or circun1stance in evidence "which in the judg-
nlent of the jury affects the credibility of any witness.'' 
The jury was further advised that if they believed thai 
any witness had ·wilfully testified falsely on any material 
1natter, then the whole of his testimony might be dis-
regarded unless such testin1ony was corroborated by 
other credible evidence. 
Although the court did not specifically refer to prior 
inconsistent statmnents, it would be a naive jury indeed, 
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which would fail to understand that prior inconsistent 
statements of a 1naterial nature, not satisfactorily ex-
plained, would affect the credibility of the witness. Al-
though the requests presented by the plaintiff might 
properly have been given, the refusal of the court to give 
them does not constitute error, where the jury was ad-
vised by another instruction concerning the credibility 
of witnesses. 
In 53 Am. Jur., Trial, page 557, it is said: 
"The jury are properly directed as to the 
tests of credibility by an instruction that the 
credibility of the witnesses is a question exclu-
sively for the jury, and that they have a right to 
determine from the appearance of the witnesses 
on the stand, their manner of testifying, their 
apparent intelligence or lack thereof, their youth, 
and from all the surrounding circumstances ap-
pearing on the trial, which witnesses are to be 
dee1ned worthy of credit." 
And at page 579 of the san1e text, it is further said: 
"And the refusal of a request is not error 
where the matter is covered by the court's general 
charge, or where not applicable." 
The Utah rule appears to be in accord \vith this 
view. In the case of Black v. Rocky 1l1o1Antain Bell Tel. 
Co., (Utah), 73 Pac. 514, this court sajd: 
"The following instruction was also. given: 
'You are further instructed that you are the sole 
judges of the facts in this case and the credibility 
of the witnesses. You have a right to determine 
from the appearance of the witnesses on the stand, 
their manner of testifying, their apparent candor 
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and frankness, or lack of it, their apparent intelli-
gence, and from all the other surrounding circum-
stances appearing on the trial, which witnesses 
are the more worthy of credit, and give credit 
accordingly. You are not bound to take the testi-
mony of any witness as absolutely true, and you 
should not do so if you are satisfied from all the 
facts and circumstances proved on the trial that 
such witness is mistaken in the matter testified 
by him, or that for any other reason his testimony 
is untrue or unreliable.' The appellant contends 
that the terms 'or that for any other reason his 
testimony is untrue or unreliable,' as used in this 
instruction, were error. While we do not think 
that those terms were as clear of ambiguity as is 
desirable in instructions, yet when read in con-
nection with the preceding language, and in view 
of the evidence, we do not think they were such 
as could affect the result, and were not, there-
fore, reversible error." 
No litigant is entitled to dmnand that any instruction 
of the court be given in the language fran1ed by the 
litigant or his counsel. All that any litigant can demand 
is that the jury be instructed in substance as to the 
1natters before them for consideration. The language 
of the court's instruction in this case, sufficiently advised 
the jury concerning these 1natters, and plaintiff has been 
unable to de1nonstrate any prejudice. There \Yas no pre-
judicial error in the court's refusal to charge in the 
language of plaintiff's request. 
POINT VIII 
THE APPEAL AS AGAINST HARTFORD A·CCIDENT & 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, NOT HAVING BEEN ARGUED OR 
BRIEFED, IS WAIVED. 
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Plaintiff's notice of appeal indicated that plaintiff 
appealed frmn the sunnuary judginent entered in favor 
of the defendant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Cmn-
pany, and against plaintiff on the second cause of action. 
However, that point has neither been cited nor argued in 
plaintiff's brief. Under familiar principles of appellate 
practice, it is therefore deemed waived. 3 A1n. J ur., Ap-
peal and Error, page 366; Falkner v. Smith, 77 ·utah 410, 
296 Pac. 776; Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 Pac. 
1093; Smith vs. Carbon County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P. (2d) 
259. 
CONCLUSION 
vVe believe that our ,argu1nent can be no better suln-
marized than bY quoting from the recent opinion of this 
court in the case of Joseph v. W. 1-l. Groves Latter-day 
Saints 11 ospital, 348 P. 2d 935, where this court said: 
"What the parties are entitled to and the law 
seeks to afford is an opportunity for one claiming 
a grievance which would justify legal redress to 
present it to a court or jury and to have a fair 
trial. When this is done, and the verdict and judg-
ment are entered, all presumptions are in favor 
of their validity. 'The burden is upon the appel-
lant not only to show that there was error, but that 
it was prejudicial to the extent that there is 
reasonable likelihood hat in its absence there 
would have been a different result. We find no 
such error here." 
vVe believe that a perusal of the record will con-
vince the court, that there was no evidence of negligence 
on the part of the defendants; that the plaintiff's own 
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evidence established contributory negligence on the part 
of the deceased; that there was no error in law occurring 
at the trial prejudicial to the rights of plaintiff; that 
plaintiff had a fair trial, and should abide the result. 
The judgment below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
BY RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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